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(Case called)

MS. KAPLAN: Good afternoon, your Honor, Susan Kaplan from the Kaplan Law Office and my partner, Charles Caranicas.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to both of you. Have you filed an appearance in this matter?

MS. KAPLAN: I did not file an appearance. This is an eleventh-hour appearance, but I gave the clerk my identification.

THE COURT: You'll file an appearance later today on ECF or first thing Monday morning.

MS. KAPLAN: Thank you. Yes.

THE COURT: You're admitted to practice --

MS. KAPLAN: I admitted to practice in these courts.

THE COURT: Welcome.

MS. KAPLAN: Thank you.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, Thomas D'Antonio from Ward Greenberg Heller & Reidy; my colleague, Joshua Agins; and Cheryl Orwel from University Counsel at Weill Cornell.

THE COURT: Now, Chief Judge Preska earlier, when this matter was first filed, authorized the filing under seal. I've reviewed the papers that have been submitted in connection with this matter and accordingly I think it is in the best interests of the parties that this matter continue to remain under seal to protect the educational privacy rights of the individuals who are involved.

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To that end I note that counsel for Cornell is here. Who are the other individuals in the courtroom? Because I am going to seal the courtroom. Gentlemen, I would like you to identify yourselves

MR. KAHN: My names is James Kahn. I'm counsel for Weill Cornell.

THE COURT: You're in-house?

MR. KAHN: That is correct.

MR. KORETZKY: My name is Gary Koretzky. I am the dean of the graduate school at Weill Cornell and the vice dean for research of the medical college.

THE COURT: Gentlemen, if you wish to come and sit at counsel table with the defendant's attorneys, you are free to do so. I am going to direct my deputy to seal the courtroom.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, the courtroom is now sealed.

THE COURT: This is a proceeding in connection with the pro se plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction. I'm glad that he is now represented by counsel for this proceeding. I have read all of the papers. Do you wish to be heard?

MS. KAPLAN: Yes, your Honor, we do. Would you like me to stand at the lecturn?

THE COURT: Why don't you take the podium, yes.

MS. KAPLAN: Thank you, your Honor, for hearing us.

I am going to address these issues under a large heading of asking leave of the Court to amend the plaintiff's complaint. I note that Cornell made a footnote that they were not going to make a motion to dismiss at this time, so I don't think there would be any prejudice to do so.

And as I go through my argument, not only will I be aligning the proposed amendments to the argument, but there are also some other federal questions that have come to light that also may be relevant.

It seems to me that we are here only for the preliminary injunction and not really to deal with arguments relevant to dismissal. So we then have to begin with the relevant four factors in the Second Circuit. And irreparable harm being the most urgent and immediate and perhaps the heartbeat of this whole action.

is today completed has class.

THE COURT: For the purpose of this proceeding I think it best that you refer to the plaintiff as John Doe.

MS. KAPLAN: Of course.

THE COURT: To the extent anyone refers to the complainant in the proceedings at Cornell, refer to her as Jane Doe.

MS. KAPLAN: I apologize. You're absolutely correct.

Mr. Doe completed his last class of his medical degree at Cornell just before arriving to court today. Cornell

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permitted him to attend his classes after the appeal punishment. Cornell permitted him to not only attend classes but to complete rotations after the first panel review punishment that determined the punishment he is now under punitive. The punishment he is now under imposes a one-year suspension, apparently starting today on gaining his degree. He has earned it vis-a-vis class work. But he needs his degree.

THE COURT: And the graduation or hooding ceremony is when.

MS. KAPLAN: Wednesday, I believe. I believe it's

next Wednesday. And on June 1, which I believe is more or less
a week from next Wednesday, is when he is supposed to begin his
residency. Mr. Doe earned one of 200 seats in the entire

country as a resident in He was planning on his
residency is located in The name escapes me, but a
public hospital in It's a seven-year residency with a
salary.

I also want to add that Mr. Doe was one of maybe two or three African American students in his class. The harm here is comparable to Doe V. Middlebury College, which is a college in Vermont. It was attended to by the District Court of Vermont which is in the Second Circuit. In that case a preliminary injunction was granted a student. He was a graduating senior who had a job lined up, a nice job, and the

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Court determined that a suspension at that point could not be remedied economically as the defendants here suggest that this is a tremendous gutting of the young man's future career. I would say the same is here.

without this residency -- and a career in cannot be measured just in money, though of course there is income involved that could be tallied and estimated. But this is a calling. This is a life choice. This is the alpha and the mega of his life and his interests and his goals and his motives. If he is not permitted to go to his residency on June 1, one wonders where he may be able to wind up. It certainly will not be in a program. The damage that that kind of failure to participate in puts him back in the pool and his future is utterly speculative, totally taken off course.

The defendants argue that the harm is greater to the public than to Mr. Doe in a very I think creative expansion of what their mandate is. Cornell is mandated under Title IX vis-a-vis the DOE, the Department of Education, and the OCR, the Office of Civil Rights, 2011 dear colleague letter.

Under Title IX, their whole job is to deal with sexual harassment on campus so that the student is not deprived of educational benefits. Cornell seems to be arguing that they are somehow permitted to deprive patients in a public hospital of medical attention from Mr. Doe. This is way beyond their mandate. Their mandate is limited and so is the due process

under which they exercise the discipline that they mete out.

I have serious problems with the due process that

Cornell provides. It's a private institution. They apparently
believe that they only have to adhere to the prescriptions in
the dear colleague letter. I'm not arguing that they have to
adhere to the Fourteenth Amendment. But even under the 2011
dear colleague letter, they come up short.

seem to suggest, the patients who he may care for in it would seem to me that that's a liberty and property interest that would be more protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, that even a private institution limited to a Title IX mandate makes sure there is no sexual harassment on campus, makes sure that whatever is alleged as sexual harassment has risen to the level of depriving someone of an educational benefit. They have now said, where there is limited due process may work it out, they are saying, no, we need to protect the public. That's the job of the criminal justice system. That's not the job of Cornell. They do not have that mandate and they did not follow a single due process procedure that would justify that expansion, unilateral expansion of their mandate.

As was argued or as the Court in the Middlebury case pointed out, the balance of hardships issue would also favor Mr. Doe. Again, the hardship to Weill Cornell is perhaps that their determinations and their rules and their punishment was

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not followed. But, again, that would mean for that to be adhered to, Mr. Doe would have to be deprived of his future career and perhaps even a future. We don't know what kind of bottomless pit this would leave him in really.

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The Court there, as well as other courts that have allowed preliminary injunctions for students in cases like this, DePaw University in Indiana, another district court granted it on even less demanding things. They thought that the student there being suspended for a year, having to endure a gap year and having to explain for the rest of his life that this was as a result of being found to be a sexual predator, as I believe the language was in that case, also gave it.

Here, it's a much more higher thing and they decided that Cornell Weill could endure the momentary abridgement of following its punishments and its rules until the Court can determine what actually happened, that the balance of hardships goes to the student who has to endure the loss of his future.

I also discussed a little bit of the disservice to the larger community, which is another factor of the four factors determining a preliminary injunction in that Cornell is trying to say that this saves the community at large, which is a jurisdiction that they don't have.

But beyond that, the community's only interest is that the rules of Cornell are followed, that there is no sexual harassment on campus. The community does not turn to Cornell

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in are not being treated by someone who has gone through their disciplinary program. So the disservice issue is well addressed under the same criteria that the Middlebury court and the DePaw court in Indiana of, the school can withstand a suspension of their rules until it settled, and the community at large would not be damaged.

Finally, we get to the likelihood of success. I'll deal with the federal questions first. Mr. Doe introduced a Title IX claim. It appears he is following the sensibility of Yusuf v. Vassar, which is a Second Circuit case which allowed for two approaches to gender discrimination under Title IX, claiming that there was an erroneous outcome here because of his gender and/or selective enforcement.

I add to the Yusuf v. Vassar sensibility another case, Doe v. Brown University, which also addressed Yusuf v. Vassar, and they pointed out that Title IX cases should follow Title VII standards, that allegations in a Title VII case, which is on information and belief and which you don't even get to the comparables until discovery, that if you just allege, well, I was discriminated against, I believe I was discriminated against and make allegations of what it was, normal standards for Title VII, I think what Doe v. Brown was arguing is that Title IX, Title VII, they are comparable statutes. We really shouldn't be dismissing these kinds of allegations early on

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without allowing the discovery for comparables.

I think that Mr. Doe could achieve something along those lines. We have a serious problem in this case in that in one decision Cornell Weill found in the first decision, panel decision, Cornell Weill administered a handful of punishments and expressly moved away from suspension because they themselves categorized suspension as too punitive under the circumstances. That's their language. You wouldn't need to put that label on it. It is obviously punitive. The consequences here are extreme and offensive to the conscience of society. To deprive someone who has finished his medical training and achieved this tremendous gain going into the residency is just appalling.

They determined it was too punitive. They let him stay on campus. They let him do rounds. They let him have hands-on interaction with patients. They didn't see him as harmful, which now he can't touch patients that aren't even under their purview. Yet they have to now spread their wings to that extent.

The second ground they imposed, what they previously called punitive, without much more explanation.

THE COURT: What's the difference between the role of the review panel and the appeals committee?

MS. KAPLAN: That's a good question because from what I could tell, the appeals committee, just looking at the

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timeline, could not have studied this 400-plus page detailed investigation without -- it seems to me that whatever their role is, it is not a more intense granular deliberation of the facts. If it were, this incredible detailed series of contradictions that the complainant, referring to the accuser in the initial -- in the on-campus disciplinary action, and I referred the judge to Mr. Doe's previous attorney who I believe the letters that she had written were submitted to the Court. That attorney has a criminal attorney background. And I thought she did a very detailed account of addressing the numerous contradictions that the complainant had.

Now, if you just read them casually, which I can't imagine the appellate panel could have done much more, it kind of sounds like, yeah, a lot of the little details keep repeating themselves. But if you graph it out, if you create a continuum of her claims from one end of the continuum to the other, you have a drastically different story with a cluster of familiar details in the center.

And from one end of the continuum to the other you have a story that completely occurs vertically, not on a bed, with a toe stomping, and at the other end we have either being pulled to a bed or tossed to a bed, but some activity on the bed. In one version both of them are facing the wall.

The contradictions are legion here. To the extent that a detective, one of many or several at least, that the

complainant reported her story to on information and belief, this detective not only did not believe the complainant had a set of events that would rise to, granted, criminal standards of review, which are different, but this detective also believed that she was being retaliatory, that this detective was making a judgment different from, you just don't have a case based on our standards. She was saying, this person is motivated not by her case but other standards. That was not investigated.

As I'm sure the Court is aware, this is a hot issue at the moment. The issues are being addressed across the country. There was a wonderful case decided in a case Doe v. Brandeis University where the Court said, this did not involve an injunction. But the Court said, if a college student is to be marred for life as a sexual predator, it is reasonable to require that he be provided a fair opportunity to defend himself and an impartial arbiter to make that decision. I don't know what this appeal panel did, but it certainly did not enhance the scope of its inquiry, and it did not follow through on the very effective claims of retaliation and combined with very contradictory details in this complainant's story.

In addition, the school violated Title IX and OCR directives. One of the things that they rely on is, well, the investigator recommended suspension. We are just going back to that. That's a big mistake.

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The OCR has specifically identified that when you have an investigator, as we did in this case, who does an investigation, who also weighs the facts, as this investigator did, which is to say, acts like a jury or a judge, and also recommends a sentence that you have deprived that violence, that 2009 dear colleague letter, and I'm referring to an OCR allegation which actually prohibits that, the fact that that's their safety net. But the investigator said that. The investigator was not following OCR regulations or the dear colleague letter and that recommendation was out of line.

THE COURT: I understand your point. Do you agree that the individual Jane Doe named by the plaintiff in this case is not a sueable person under Title IX?

MS. KAPLAN: Right. Title IX is against the institution. I saw your notation. That's absolutely correct.

THE COURT: I think I have your arguments.

MS. KAPLAN: I want to mention one other thing then. This is to the extent that the Court grants the preliminary injunction and allows us to proceed with an amended complaint. Second federal question would be a violation of Title VI. It has come to my attention that --

THE COURT: Can we put that to the side. I'll tell you why. First of all, under the federal rules, you can amend your complaint as of right.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

1	THE COURT: Because the issue has not been joined. We
2	can deal with all of that later. I would prefer to deal with
3	the record that I have before me now on the narrow question
4	relating to a preliminary injunction.
5	MS. KAPLAN: Just a footnote to that, however. To the
6	extent, and I'm sure Cornell Weill are going to argue very
7	extensively that he may not be able to win on the merits under
8	Title VIII. I actually think he has a stronger case under
9	Title VI because of evidence of very severe and pervasive
10	discrimination that is documented in an e-mail from his mentor
11	while he was working in a lab and that he actually even
12	reported to the school and they were indifferent to the claim.
13	THE COURT: Is that e-mail part of the record?
14	MS. KAPLAN: I do. It's not part of the record. I
15	brought a copy.
16	THE COURT: Let's put that to the side for the moment.
17	MS. KAPLAN: Thank you.
18	THE COURT: Mr. D'Antonio.
19	MR. D'ANTONIO: Thank you, your Honor. May it please
20	the Court. I know the Court has reviewed the papers, so I will
21	not propose to spend a lot of time rehashing the material
22	that's before it.
23	THE COURT: I would ask one thing. Where in the
24	record is the letter that Jane Doe sent to Weill Cornell
25	objecting to the Weill Cornell March 28 determination? I

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didn't see it in my review of the papers. Is it in the record?

MR. D'ANTONIO: I don't believe it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there some reason why it would not be?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Other than the fact that we simply chose to give the Court the investigator's report and the two subsequent determinations by the review panel --

THE COURT: Her letter was an objection.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Correct.

THE COURT: What did she say that so persuaded the university that they should essentially reverse the determination by the review panel?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Honestly, Judge, I don't have that information right in front of me. I don't know. Dr. Koretzky is here. He was a member of the appeals committee. And I can ask him.

THE COURT: I can ask him. Dr. Koretzky, what did she say that was so persuasive? Just click the button. It says push.

MR. KORETZKY: Yes. So the letter that we received was a letter of appeal from Jane Doe and she felt very strongly that the punishment that was being meted out by the review committee was inadequate or was inappropriate for the violation of Title IX. She asserted that essentially there was really no punishment, that the individual, John Doe, performed this act.

It was found by the committee that he had violated

Title IX and, as a consequence, he was completing his medical degree, moving on to residency and leaving Weill Cornell to then go on to the rest of his career with essentially no consequence whatsoever.

The consequences were that he was barred from living in the dorm and that there was a no contact order between that individual and Jane Doe, and that came to the office that was pursuing this investigation. They felt that the appeal had to be heard. So I chaired a committee of three members -- I'll be happy to tell you what we did because that's obviously an issue at this hearing. But I can tell you how we adjudicated and how we made our decision. But what the argument was from her was that the penalty was not commensurate with the violation. I'll tell you more later.

THE COURT: You're represented by counsel here and I am going to let your attorney speak and obviously as this matter develops that letter is going to need to come to light.

MR. D'ANTONIO: There is certainly no reason why,

Judge, you can't have a copy of it. It certainly wasn't

intended that we would not provide the Court with full

information. But, obviously, we were sued on Monday. We got

our papers in yesterday. We put together as much as we could

as quickly as we could.

In terms of the assessment, though, I wanted to kind of go back because I think that counsel glossed over a couple

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of factors. With regard to the likelihood of success on the merits, the fact is that the Second Circuit has made clear that with regard to these Title IX claims, the plaintiff has to establish in order to prevail either that there was some selective enforcement, and there is no evidence whatsoever that Cornell enforced this policy vis-a-vis female complainants differently than male complainants or female respondents differently vis-a-vis male respondents.

And with regard to the erroneous outcome, which is the other prong of the challenge that the plaintiff can bring, here if you boil down all of the allegations in the papers that are before the Court, and even listening to counsel's argument, the argument is that the investigator just got it wrong, that the investigator made a judgment that they disagree with and disagree with vehemently.

And there is really no question that Jane Doe's version of events and John Doe's version of events are markedly different one from another, but that's why we have a model that permits an investigation, a review panel, and, upon an appeal, a review by the appeals committee.

Judge, you asked what's the difference between a review panel and the appeals committee, and frankly it's in Exhibit E to the Koretzky declaration, and that's the report of the appeals committee. So the way that the process is set up, there is an investigator who is responsible for investigating

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the allegations and making an assessment of both credibility, gathering documents, and doing the kind of things that you and juries do regularly.

THE COURT: Why would the investigator make a recommendation then of punishment?

MR. D'ANTONIO: That's the policy. The policy 6.4, which is Exhibit A to the Murray declaration that's before the Court, permits -- not only permits it, requires it. And it's the review committee, which is an independent three-member panel of Cornell faculty or staff, sits in review of that assessment and in this case not only reviewed the assessment but also took testimony or heard from both Jane Doe and John Doe and John Doe and John Doe of the present to the fact finder with regard to people that would make an assessment of responsibility.

And the assessment of responsibility, by the way, it should not be lost on this Court, was consistent. There was not a single person sitting in review that disagreed with the responsibility outcome, finding John Doe responsible. No one agreed with John Doe. There is clearly a disagreement with regard to the sanction. Again, the Koretzky declaration speaks to that.

at Exhibit E, page 2, the following are the allowable grounds

for appeal. And point 1 is, the sanction is not commensurate

Basically, the appeals committee, if you take a look

with the violation or is unjust. That and prong 4, which is
the remedial actions awarded the complainant, are not
commensurate with the injury or are unjust, essentially the
same thing, just looking at it from either the complainant or
respondent's perspective. Those two things were revealed by
the appeals committee, as well as No. 5, which is the
investigator or reviewer rendered a decision clearly against
the evidence. So they looked at all of that.

And there has been some supposition on the part of John Doe's counsel that how could the appeal committee possibly have looked at this appeal carefully. How could they possibly have looked at the 350 pages that are the investigation report carefully. They had four weeks, more than four weeks, actually. The determination was issued by the review panel on March 14 and the appeals committee decided the matter on April 28. And Dr. Koretzky is here and can tell you -- I don't have to speak for him. He read every single page, every single page. So this is not a situation where I think that a credible claim can be established with regard to erroneous outcome.

We have put in our papers that beyond the nonspeculative there is really nothing. And even if they got it wrong, under Title IX they have to get it wrong because they are driven by a bias-based bond gender, and there is no evidence of that, none. There is a suggestion in the papers that Cornell had it out for the respondent, John Doe, because

he is male. The only fact that they put in the record, the only fact they pleaded that allows that court to come to that conclusion is, he is in fact male. That's not enough.

With regard to the irreparable injury --

THE COURT: What about the contract claims?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Well, interestingly enough, Judge, the contract claim would be that we failed to follow our own process. Where? If you read policy 6.4, we laid it out for the Court. There is no place that the medical college failed to follow its own process. That's all he gets. He has a right to the process. I know the Court is well aware of those cases that basically say that when a court makes a determination that in fact the process has been followed, that's essentially the scope of the inquiry, and we submit that the process was followed.

THE COURT: Doesn't the process require a prompt investigation?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Yes.

THE COURT: I'm kind of stunned, quite frankly, by the record that I read here where a complaint is made in September and an investigator, at a relatively leisurely pace, conducts interviews, conducts a couple of interviews in September, a few interviews in early October, and then a few more in early November, and then doesn't even issue a report until the middle of January when a medical student is in the middle of his

studies with this hanging over his head. That just doesn't

strike me as a prompt investigation.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, respectfully, I have to disagree. I understand that the Court looked at the kind of the beginning and the end of the timeline. I submit that there were a number of situations -- again, I think that the report itself speaks to that. There were delays that were forwarded to the respondent because his lawyer made a request for additional time. This is a process that obviously they went through it carefully and they wanted to get it right. The investigation reveals they spoke with nine different people, including the police officer who was charged with responsibility for investigating the criminal complaint. Obviously, what the law enforcement people do with their burdens of proof and what an institution are supposed to do under Title IX are vastly different, and the DCL recognizes that right up front.

I don't think this was a situation where the process was strung out by Weill Cornell in order to try to prejudice the respondent. In fact, to the contrary. As a good example, the only appeal that was taken from the review panel's determination was by the complainant.

THE COURT: I thought that was rather remarkable. You're faulting John Doe for not taking an appeal.

MR. D'ANTONIO: I don't think I'm faulting him. I'm

just pointing out the reality.

THE COURT: The appeals committee in their decision essentially faults him for not having pursued an appeal when perhaps he just wanted to move on at that point because he wasn't confronted with a draconian penalty.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, I don't know that I think you can read that into what happened here. We had a situation --

THE COURT: I can read into it based on the papers that I've got. What does Cornell think that John Doe is going to do for the next year?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, let me speak to that for a minute, please.

THE COURT: I'm anxious to hear about that.

MR. D'ANTONIO: That's fine. One of the things that often happens, John Doe learned of this allegation in September, in mid-September. That's the time when the ability to apply for residency training programs opens. So you can't actually even apply to a residency training program under the match system until mid-September.

One option would have been for John Doe to wait for this process to conclude.

THE COURT: I can't believe you are going to make that argument. Please. Don't insult my intelligence. Would you do that? If you were in medical school would you say, you know what, I'll put my life on hold because a former girlfriend with

whom I had an intense sexual relationship that I broke off is 1 now making a claim against me and the university is 2 investigating and she has gone to the police several times and 3 4 the police have rejected her claims? And I recognize there is a different standard. You know what. Detectives are awfully good at assessing credibility. 6 MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, I'll tell you that the issue is many medical students opt, for example, to work in a postdoc 8 year, to work in a lab, to do a number of things. 9 10 THE COURT: To put their life on a hold for a year. 11

What does Cornell expect him to do if the suspension remains in place? He won't graduate next week.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Correct.

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THE COURT: What should he do? Should he go out and get a job in a delicatessen.

MR. D'ANTONIO: I suspect with his training, Judge, that he would do more than get a job at a delicatessen.

THE COURT: Tell me what he would do.

MR. D'ANTONIO: He can work in a lab. He can work in a postdoc.

THE COURT: What happens with his student debts, his loans? Are they put in suspense?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, I have no idea what his student loans are.

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THE COURT: They are in the record.

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1	MR. D'ANTONIO: No, they are not. I don't think they
2	are.
3	MS. KAPLAN: They are, Judge.
4	THE COURT: I saw something just shy of \$400,000
5	someplace in the record.
6	MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, I don't know. If it is in the
7	record, it is in the record.
8	THE COURT: It scares me if I know the record better
9	than the lawyers who are before me because I have not had this
10	case any longer than you have. Tell me what he's supposed to
11	do.
12	What I find so remarkable, they say, he's a threat to
13	the Cornell community, so we are not going to let him graduate
14	His life is going to be in suspense. Maybe he will stay around
15	Cornell Weill trying to do odd jobs.
16	MR. D'ANTONIO: First of all, Judge, I don't know wha
17	he would do. I know that he's obviously a highly educated
18	individual who will have options.
19	THE COURT: Would you say that those options are
20	dramatically narrowed by a suspension?
21	MR. D'ANTONIO: I would say that they are postponed
22	for a year.
23	THE COURT: Do you really think he could go back to

get his degree and he was suspended for a year?

when learns that he didn't

MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, what if in fact -THE COURT: Could you just answer that question.

MR. D'ANTONIO: I am trying to answer the question. I don't know what would do. But I can tell you this. If in fact the investigative report and the review panel and the appeals committee, all of whom agreed that he violated Title IX, are correct, what is Cornell supposed to do with that? And what is supposed to do with that? Those are findings that were made pursuant to a process that gave him more than adequate opportunity to participate and be heard. He wound up not prevailing in that process. He was found responsible. I don't think we can dismiss that.

So what is Cornell to do? Cornell, when it issues a degree, is supposed to be confident that the person that receives that degree, there is an imprimatur that they have the requisite character and professionalism as well as the requisite training.

Again, if you presume that in fact everybody is wrong and John Doe is correct --

THE COURT: What is it that will occur between next Wednesday and a year from now that will assure Cornell that John Doe has the requisite training and professionalism to receive a coveted degree from Cornell Weill?

MR. D'ANTONIO: Among other things, Judge, one of the sanctions was that he was supposed to go and get some

counseling on both anger management and on domestic violence. 1 And I believe that part of the recommendation was that those 2 reports are going to be shared with the university. And I 3. would assume that one of the things that would make them more 4 comfortable is that in fact he's a person that has the requisite professionalism and character and they get a satisfactory report in that regard. They won't have that 7 between now and next Wednesday. 8 9 THE COURT: What else? MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, you've seen our 10 11 argument --THE COURT: They want to monitor his psychotherapy. 12 13 Is that it? 14 MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, I believe --THE COURT: Is that it? 15 16 MR. D'ANTONIO: I wouldn't --THE COURT: Let me ask this. Are they monitoring the 17 psychotherapy of Jane Doe? 18 MR. D'ANTONIO: I believe, Judge, that the record 19 suggests that Jane Doe came forward and was having some serious problems and I believe they tried to counsel with her, but of 21 22 course --

MR. D'ANTONIO: Yes, your Honor.

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Cornell?

THE COURT: Is Jane Doe continuing to be enrolled at

THE COURT: Cornell doesn't have any problem with her?

MR. D'ANTONIO: She wasn't accused of violating Title

IX, Judge.

THE COURT: Did you read some of the lascivious texts --

MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, I do a lot of Title IX work and I have to tell you, those texts unfortunately are more common than I can believe. I don't think those texts amount to the Title IX violations that we are talking about. I think that the only person who was alleged to have committed an act of sexual battery was John Doe. The only person who wound up with a broken toe and in the emergency room for treatment of that broken toe was Jane Doe. I know that the Court obviously seems to have a point of view with regard to this.

THE COURT: No. I have a perspective based upon what I have read, and I'm looking to you to tell me why such a harsh penalty should be imposed. And so far you have only told me that Cornell wants to monitor and receive reports for a year relating to his psychotherapy before it might decide to give him a degree.

MR. D'ANTONIO: No, Judge. I think actually even Dr. Koretzky said it just now, a little while ago, and he will be happy to say it again and it's in his declaration.

In addition to that, I believe that the reason that the sanction was issued is because the appeals committee

determined that, in fact, the sanction was appropriate based on the findings of what he did.

THE COURT: Where is the letter? Do you have the letter objecting from Jane Doe here today? I'd like to see it right now. Do you have it, Dr. Koretzky?

MR. KORETZKY: I don't have the document with me.

THE COURT: How about you, counsel. Do you have it?

MR. KAHN: I do not have it.

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THE COURT: I bet Cornell is trying to protect itself here from Jane Doe.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, I think that's speculative and I think you are wrong.

THE COURT: A determination was reversed based upon a letter objection from the complainant, you omit it from the record, and you don't bring it to Court.

MR. D'ANTONIO: I don't think that's a fair characterization of what occurred.

THE COURT: It's a statement of fact.

MR. D'ANTONIO: I didn't omit it --

THE COURT: It's not here.

MR. D'ANTONIO: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: And you've argued that it was based upon that letter that the appeals committee decided that there had to be a more severe punishment.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge, I think what Dr. Koretzky said

was not based on the letter. He said that the circumstances were such that the complainant felt that there was really no punishment, and then they independently reviewed and came to a determination, and here is the finding: We find that the one-year suspension is commensurate with the seriousness of the violation the respondent was found to have committed, sexual battery, sexual misconduct, and domestic violence, as recommended in the investigative report. 2. We disagree with the rationale of the review panel for allowing the respondent to graduate in May 2016. In particular, the appeals committee finds that allowing the respondent to graduate would minimize the gravity of the violation of policy 6.4, particularly given the undisputed physical injuries suffered by the complainant during the September 17, 2015 incident.

What the appeals committee also said and what Dr. Koretzky said is that if in fact this violation had occurred and John Doe was in his first year or second year or third year, there would be no question with regard to the issuance of a one-year suspension. The fact that he was in his fourth year, the committee felt, while it recognized that that was a potential problem for the respondent, the respondent engaged in the conduct and was found responsible and they didn't feel that they could simply dismiss the fact that it occurred in his fourth year.

THE COURT: You read a finding like that, carefully

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crafted by Dr. Koretzky and probably some lawyers. But I go back to her statement, what she told the Title IX investigator on September 18. So you want to quote from the record, I'll quote from the record. "Jane Doe declined his propositions but reluctantly agreed to one hug. She claims that at one point he tried to forcefully pull her over toward him to cuddle and in doing so she lost her balance and fell forward, where her foot crashed into his foot. Her fourth toe was broken (ER visit later that day). She was in pain and yelling and a roommate was also there and heard it. She wanted Doe to leave." That's Exhibit C at page 136. That's what she said. But the appeals committee has machined it into something else.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Judge.

THE COURT: Do you have anything else? We are going to take five minutes and then I'm ruling.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Your Honor, I'm happy to have Dr. Koretzky talk with you if you have questions of him.

I'll quickly summarize, Judge. I don't think there is a likelihood of success on the merits in this case. We briefed that extensively. I believe that there is an absence of irreparable injury.

THE COURT: We certainly disagree on that.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Yes, we do. And even if we do, that's only one prong of the test.

THE COURT: It is.

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MR. D'ANTONIO: And with regard to the balance of the
equities, we point out that the equities vis-a-vis John Doe do
not tip decidedly in his favor. And we pointed out that the
public is certainly not well served while this situation still
remains to be adjudicated. A preliminary injunction, all that
would do is obviously prohibit the institution from instituting
the suspension. It doesn't vitiate the finding and it doesn't
constitute an ultimate determination.

THE COURT: No. But we are talking about graduation

THE COURT: No. But we are talking about graduation next Wednesday and a hooding ceremony.

MR. D'ANTONIO: Yes, your Honor. That's what we are talking about.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. D'ANTONIO: No. Thank you.

THE COURT: We will take two minutes.

(Recess)

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THE COURT: Over the last several days this Court has reviewed all of the lengthy submissions that have been made in connection with plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and I have listened to counsel's arguments. There is an immediate need for this application for a preliminary injunction to be resolved and I'm prepared to rule at this time.

Plaintiff brings this action under Title IX of the United States Education Amendments of 1972 and applicable New

York state law alleging that Weill Cornell Medical College and

Jane Doe violated university policies on investigating Title IX

complaints and violated his right to be free from

discrimination in a federally funded education program.

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable injury, a balance of hardships tipping in his favor, and a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in plaintiff's favor, and that the public interest would not be disserved by issuing an injunction.

Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, 784 F.3d 887 at 895 (2d Cir. 2015).

Here, plaintiff has amply demonstrated irreparable injury, that a balance of the hardships is in his favor and that the public interest would not be disserved from issuing an injunction. I find Cornell's arguments, which I considered largely ridiculous in the motion papers, to have those arguments repeated here is mind boggling to me. Suspending plaintiff after he has completed all course work, preventing him from graduating and proceeding to his postgraduation fellowship will either destroy or impose substantial harm to his future career as a doctor, a ______. And Weill Cornell has articulated no reason why permitting plaintiff to graduate would impose substantial harm to it.

Under New York law, an implied contract is formed when a university accepts a student for enrollment. If the student 2 complies with the terms prescribed by the university and 3 completes the required courses, the university must award him a 5 degree. Papelino v. Albany College of Pharmacy of Union 6 University, 633 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). The terms of the implied contract are contained in the university's bulletins, 8 circulars and regulations made available to the student. 9 Implicit in the contract is the requirement that the institution act in good faith in its dealings with its 11 students. Papelino, 633 F.3d at 81. When a private college or university has adopted a rule or guideline establishing the 12 13 procedure to be followed in relation to suspension or expulsion 14 of a student for nonacademic reasons, that procedure must be substantially observed. Fraad-Wolff v. Vassar College, 932 16 F.Supp., 88, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). A plaintiff is likely to 17 succeed on such a contract claim when the record demonstrates that the disciplinary proceeding concluded in a manner that was 18 19 "illegal, arbitrary, or capricious," or illustrates that the plaintiff was treated in bad faith. King v. DePaw University, 20 21 2014 WL 4197507 at *11 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2014). Here, Cornell University's policy 6.4 guarantees that 23

Here, Cornell University's policy 6.4 guarantees that an individual accused of sexual misconduct has certain rights guaranteed by the university. Specifically, Cornell guarantees the right to a "prompt and fair investigation and

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adjudication/disciplinary process that adheres to legal and policy requirements of due process." That's in the rights of individuals throughout a sexual misconduct proceeding.

Additionally, all students receive the right to participate in a process that's fair, impartial, and provides adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. That's in Cornell university's Bill of Rights.

Here, Weill Cornell conducted an extensive, protracted investigation into the complainant's allegations. The comprehensive investigative report concluded that neither party's version of the events could be credited wholesale. Indeed the investigative report and accompanying papers demonstrated that the complainant's accountants of the incident were contradictory. In an initial review by Title IX investigators and an assistant district attorney, the complainant described the incident as "horse play" and as an awkward "hug" in the course of which the plaintiff stepped on her toe. The record evidence provided substantial reason to doubt the complainant and her motivations in several instances in which the complainant herself aggressively propositioned the plaintiff for sex. But the investigative report dismissed any inconsistencies as attributable to the complainant's anxiety and concluded that plaintiff should be sanctioned by suspending him at the moment the academic year ended so that he would not graduate from medical school. The complainant wanted the

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plaintiff expelled. On March 14, 2016, Cornell's review panel also found against the plaintiff but concluded that the suspension was "unduly punitive" and would only prolong the amount of time plaintiff spent on campus, precisely one of the things that Cornell wanted to avoid with their purported claim of protecting the Cornell community.

Nonetheless, the complainant, who initially sought plaintiff's expulsion, appealed and argued that Weill Cornell should reimpose the sanction of preventing the plaintiff from graduating. Weill Cornell gave a threadbare explanation for suddenly reversing course, stating that it would "minimize the gravity" of plaintiff's university policy violation if he were "allowed to graduate" from a medical school at which he had completed all applicable case work and was prepared to proceed to a fellowship program. Talk about bureaucratese.

And the appeals committee was quick to point out that the plaintiff didn't appeal, so they were considering that.

The plaintiff didn't appeal because he was prepared to live with the sanction that the review panel had imposed, perhaps even if he disagreed with it, so that he could get back to his medical career. The only thing that changed between the review panel and the appeals committee was a letter objecting from the complainant. Notably, just about everything else has been produced in the record, but not that letter. The plaintiff suggests in his papers that the complainant is very vindictive

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and it will be interesting to see what the relationship is between the complainant and Cornell at the current time. One might be able to fairly infer, though I don't need it for this decision, that the complainant has threatened Cornell with litigation as she pursues her campaign against the plaintiff, who ended the relationship with her.

There is at the end of the day something called the rule of law and in this Court's view Cornell's proceeding failed to comply with the basic requirements of fairness for the accused and afforded inappropriate solicitude to the complainant's demands that the review panel's determination was not enough.

Accordingly, this Court is enjoining Weill Cornell

Medical College from halting plaintiff's graduation and

directing that Cornell include him in the hooding ceremony next

week.

I'll simply note that although this Court finds it unnecessary at this juncture to address the Title IX to reach this conclusion, this Court notes that plaintiff's Title IX claims appear to be substantially stronger than those of analogous actions in this district. Given Weill Cornell's contradictory and inconsistent approaches to alleged sexual advances by the plaintiff and sexual advances by the complainant, it's plausible that a court could also find grounds for a preliminary injunction on that basis, but I'm not

going that far.

This constitutes the decision of this Court.

Anything further?

MS. KAPLAN: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. D'ANTONIO: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't you sit down and talk about resolving this case before it goes further. Quite frankly, I'm appalled by what I see in this record and it would be good to resolve the matter because it could wind up being unsealed at some point with the identities, of course, redacted. And if it goes much further I likely will do that because I don't believe in sealing matters except for minors and classified information, and neither of those matters pertain here. And it could certainly be an issue of significant public interest in New York about what a leading medical school is doing. Try to resolve it because otherwise it's going to come out.

I will get you in for a conference in a couple of weeks if you have not resolved the case, so prepare a 26(f) report so that I know what you are proposing. And if you are going to amend the complaint, when are you going to do that?

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, like I told your clerk, I was an eleventh hour appointee.

THE COURT: Try resolving the case first.

MS. KAPLAN: I will.

THE COURT: Have a good afternoon. (Adjourned)